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Abstract
This article analyses the intellectual, religious, national and moral processes through which a
democratic society has had to confront in its day-to-day routines under the ever-present
threat of terror. It discusses the effects of the terror over the character of Israeli society and
the critical debates in its system of education. As far as it can be ascertained through the
observations in this study, the general publics’ attitude could be defined as a mildly moral
realistic one: people think that terror and violence have objective foundations but certainly
embody some subjective human conventions and beliefs.

Is it possible in a democratic society to aspire to peace during a long period of war
and terror, and how should moral education be taught in accordance with critical and
reflective principles in such circumstances? What are the intellectual and spiritual options to
explain the existence of terror in Israeli society, a daily fact of life that compels an entire
society to carry on with their day-to-day routines under the ever-present threat of terror?
How then, should teachers start their daily teaching routine or react in front of their pupils to
the reality of living with the constant threat of terrorism or actually experiencing acts of
terror?
These questions and many other similar questions are asked in every Israeli
classroom as well as in many other places all over the world. By definition, it is quite
obvious that terror is a universal method of exercising power by spreading fear and horror.
In that case, if terror is a constant universal reality, should teachers put aside their regular
daily teaching in an attempt to give explanations again and again about what has happened?
Would this be a successful way of providing a channel to filter students' responses while
allowing them to vent their feelings? If everyone in every society could be a target of terror,
are there any particular proficiencies or skills that would enable teachers to explain what had
happened and why? Should every teacher carry on with ‘business as usual’ thus seeking to
maintain normalcy and a sense of control by adhering to routine as the best manner of
addressing such a horrific reality?
Aspirations for a global society governed by everyone playing fairly by the rules, has
been one of the casualties of September 11th. The fall of the Berlin Wall brought with it hope
of establishing a new world order, founded on international law and paralleled by the spread
of institutions for international co-operation. However, in recent years a nightmare scenario
of growing world disorder and rising ethnic tensions has replaced the global dream of a
world governed by enlightened self-control by a community of peace-loving nations with a
world rife with the prospect of mega-terrorism and amplification of violence and bloodshed
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as a frightening reality. Apparently the political goals at the beginning of 21st century
inflame new wars and terror, on the basis of traditional identities, i.e. religion, tribe and
nation.
The postmodern culture, characterized by rapid social, technological and global
change has not collapsed in the wake of September 11th. The recent phenomena of terror
challenge our minds and spirits. To advance our agenda, we must try hard to understand it,
empathize with it, and above all use its shocking images to mobilize public opinion against
it. Even the debate as to what should be defined as an act of terror has been transformed into
a question that postmodernists believe should be answered in accordance with the
philosophical tools of relativism and deconstruction.
Postmodern culture has turned traditional concepts of objective reality, truth,
morality and justice upside down. Everything that in the past was the product of complex
traditions, history and tragic conflict is considered too complicated, removed and distanced
from the new media and relegated to the level of a provincial problem that has no relevance
or impact on normal life patterns in any Western country. Problems are framed in simplistic
and hollow universal contexts, devoid of genuine content or depth that can be summarized in
a few simple sentences. At one time, terror as a phenomenon had been relegated to the
province of underdeveloped countries, and only became universal when it reached New
York, Washington, Paris or Madrid. In the hands of postmodernists, deciphering terrorism
as a phenomenon has suffered the same simplistic explanations as other facets of reality
viewed through the prism of postmodern relativistic values.
The intellectual romantic view tends to mitigate and humanize horrific and inhuman
terrorist acts by highlighting and underscoring the fact that terror has contributed far less to
the sum total of human violence than state-sponsored violence, modern mass ideologies (i.e.
Fascism, Nazism, Communism, religious wars, etc.), organized crime, poverty or diseases.
Furthermore, they would argue, terror as seen in Algeria, Chechnya, Sri-Lanka, Russia,
USA, Columbia, Afghanistan, Spain, Indonesia, India, Iraq or Israel, has been provoked by
local problems and tensions – poverty, civil war and/or continuous traumas of the
decolonization processes. Therefore, is not really terror since the latter requires a demonic
perpetrator and an innocent victim.
Postmodernists not only view these forces as irrelevant to enlightened, advanced
developed nations which are now above such despicable behavior other than they tend to
legitimize such violence, justifying it as motivated by “noble” ideals, viewing the loss of
human life as excesses that may be a necessary prelude or preliminary stage to a better
social, economical, political or religious order as had been the case in their own dark history.
Terror is viewed, if not outwardly, as a legitimate tool or in the least as an unavoidable
escort to every social, political or religious revolution that one should expect, if not accept as
part of the game. Far more damaging, to a certain extent, the romantic worldview seems
tainted by a fascination, even a love, of the forces of destruction wrought by acts of terror.
Such an approach seems to be shortsighted and unproductive, calling in a need for a far more
comprehensive and complex approach to addressing terrorism is called for.
Although terror currently holds the entire world in suspense, anxiety and mental
uncertainty, many intellectuals, teachers and social-political experts still argue that living
under its siege could be avoided if every existing democratic society would be pushed into
developing a military culture based on the realities of war and terror.
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From the international point of view, terror is comprehended as a privatized method
which is derived from a combination of fundamentalist fanaticism – either religious or
nationalist – and blatant crime. Crime is involved in the procurement of means as well as the
methods of combat in which humane laws become irrelevant. This mixture of fanaticism and
crime, in various proportions, can be observed everywhere by social-political extremists as
well as by their victims, by fundamentalists as well as by Western societies, by poor as well
as by wealthy people. In the case of the Middle East conflicts, terror is flourishing all the
way through the continuous conditions caused neither by war nor peace, conditions that
seem permanent… a desperate infinity. There is no monopoly of power in the Middle East
and there is no ultimate body that would elaborate the criteria of a legitimate force for
combating violence and terror. The challenging reality in Israel, the past tragedies of the
Jewish people as well as the tragedy of the Palestinian people and the seemingly hopeless
situation in the present, continue to be a nihilistic threat to the society’s very existence so
that a profound sense of psychological depression, personal worthlessness and social-cultural
despair overwhelm the society as a whole.
The outcomes of this delirious situation of Israeli society have a high impact on
every domain of life, on daily base, on every decision that is taken at each moment.
Consequently, the civil and cultural conflict over the character of Israeli society is at the
present time enlightened under the shadow of war and terror, and is one of the most critical
debates in that country’s history and its system of education. The stakes in this battle are
very high. Crises in identity and values accompanying the State since the beginning of this
century have characterized the modern history of Israeli versus Palestinian societies.
This study sees social-political debate and current events focusing on terrorism as a
work of both reconstruction and deconstruction:
1.
Reconstruction: What really is happening in every society and why are we facing
an increase in terrorism as a widespread phenomenon? This can be addressed by
reading government and media reports together with social-political enquiries. In
addition, discussing and analyzing underutilized sources of recollections, oral
testimonies, and other materials can provide fruitful resources for a reconstructive
curriculum of sociology, moral education, history, psychology and debates on actual
events.
2.
Deconstruction: What did acts of terror want to achieve and what did they achieve
in reality? What are the cultural trends to which they related and who are the professional
authorities on which they state their cases?
In point of fact, the object of this study on terror is to provide an educational tool by
which people can more readily create an image that will be universally respected, and in
effect sustain and broaden the personal, social, and intellectual conditions in which such a
phenomena can flourish, not for its own sake but for moral human ends. Granted, such an
explicit practice may not appear to have the intensity one could imagine present in a heated
dialogue with one of the terrorists or in the internal dialogue about moral and social causes
and means. It is also important to note that the destruction wrought by terror has a high
impact going beyond the immediate victims – reshaping the society subject to such
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onslaughts of terror. Reflecting on this phenomenon, some major trends seem to emerge
when one seeks to examine and analyze the phenomenology of terrorism in the light of the
literature, testimonies and recollections.
•

Terror and violence is a central issue of discussion all over the world. Traditional
definitions of evil hold that intentions are evil if they lead to evil actions, namely terror
and violence. So are of terrorist acts - if the preponderance of their actions is evil. People
often refer to institutions, states, tribes, cults or beliefs as evil. It is common to consider
evil actions to be a widespread phenomenon and to hold that their main goal is to inflict
suffering (Alston, 1991).

•

Questions relating to the subjects’ definitions of terror and violence, the quality of terror
and violence and its distribution in the world seem to result in people redefining their
daily attitude towards reality. Do we accept terror and violence as part of our everyday
existence, or is it an ex-mundi experience? Are we dealing with ordinary people caught up
in extraordinary deeds and driven to achieve their goals by indulging in evil acts? Is terror
a genetic or environmental factor or a combination of both perhaps? Do we attribute vice
and evil to the Other in order to ‘prove’ that evil is not a part of we ourselves? (Kekes,
1990).

•

The perpetrators of acts of terrorism are untroubled by guilt or feelings of remorse about
innocent people who would be killed or maimed. The widespread reaction of the publicat-large is due to the haphazard nature of the acts which leave everyone feeling
vulnerable. In addition, because the identity of the victims and the identity of the
perpetrators tend to be mutually exclusive and ethnically defined, public hatred tends to
be towards every person belonging to that group perceived to be an enemy. The growth
of such a culture of defused hatreds is one of the greatest achievements of terror for it
tends to muffle the effectiveness, if not completely silence the voice of the rational
humanist educator.

•

Horrific acts of premeditated terrorism motivated by high ideals and principles, not the
product of a spontaneous yet wanton act of hatred toward the potential victims, is not
just acceptable or justifiable in some circles. All too many national and religious leaders
are treating terror as something patently and positively good. Instead of serving as a
vehicle for implementation of a calculated rational policy, the act of terror has been
characterized by broader circles as a vehicle for expressing more general frustrations
and resentment, forcing the normal strata of society to recognize not only the terrorists’
existence, but the Other’s existence as part of their own reality. This strategy, however,
tends to disrupt normality between ethnic communities altogether and exacerbating
tensions.

•

Acts of terror have not brought about the political, social or religious goals they were
meant to encourage. They have sparked countermeasures where governments adopt
repressive measures that are justified by the general public as a suitable response to
aggression – attitudes that one finds echoed in every classroom. Terrorism triggers a
cycle of aggression described by the participants of both sides as inevitable and
unending as each side seeks to defend themselves; the perpetrators perceive themselves
to be victims of an oppressive and repressive government and the genuine, true victims.

•

Adopting a moral code of democratic education is ineffective and ultimately
unsuccessful when it comes to terrorism. Even when legitimate means of protest are
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available, there has been no shortage of those who opt for terrorism anyway, perceiving
these implemented methods as purposely deceitful and ineffective. The temptation to
excuse terrorist methods because other avenues for protest are blocked simply is not
substantiated in reality.
•

The facet of terrorism that is hard to explain to the secular public is how individuals can
be so driven by vengeance, by a culture of martyrdom and religious fervor to “go to
Heaven”. The assumption of rational secular human beings is that religious wars are
history, a period that is not only behind us, but best done, buried and forgotten.
Reconsidering the motivations that drive suicide bombings in this light is difficult for the
vast majority of the public, it being far easier to assume there is a logical (i.e. addressable
and treatable) force driving people to blow themselves up – despair or poverty or the
meaningless of life. Indicative of these approaches are the words of a young man who
opposes any attempt to blacken the “good name” of each and every suicide bomber
remarking: “If I die when I'm dead, that's one thing. But if I die while I'm still alive, then
what's the point of living? A person like me is driven by emotions and the faith that Allah
will protect and help you achieve victory” (Haaretz, 2003).

•

The belief that those who are ready to die for the exalted cause can look forward to the
delights of Paradise are evidently enough for many young people to commit such acts.
What underlies this motivation? Reports indicate that the promise of eternal life in
Paradise plays a central role among volunteers ready and willing to blow themselves up.
Every individual cherishes the earthly life, yet it is easier to give up that life if one
believes this will lead to an even better life in the Next World. Thus, those who choose
this avenue seek not to end their lives but to extend it. While this logic may seem
twisted to a secular mind, choosing to die in sanctification of Allah's name stems
primarily from a love of life. Furthermore, promising 72 virgins to every Shahid,
especially in a puritanical and traditional society that offers few legitimate outlets for
sexual tensions, demonstrates the power potential in redirecting the sex drive to other
ends and now well in tune with human nature these promises in the Koran and in Islam
are – well before Freud appeared on the scene.

•

What about the old theological question whether the existence of evil and violence
shows Biblical theism to be logically inconsistent? That is: is it logically possible for an
omnipotent and perfectly righteous God to create a world containing so much evil,
violence and terror? (Rowe, 1991). There are many mystical and religious theories that,
through revelations and ultimate explanations about violence and terror, seek to
reconcile the two. While many of these explanations perhaps make human misery and
suffering more endurable, are they reasonable in the eyes of the beholder?

•

Numerous killings by suicide bombers and other terror attacks as well as casualties in
combat: During the new Intifada in Israel (2001-2004) peace has been transformed from
a reasonable arrangement that is supposed to prevent terror and violence between
nations, into a concept of deliverance full of violence, brutality and disaster. Jews and
Arabs gave up the assumption that “Good” is predominant, then vainly struggled to
explain the prevalence of terror and violence. Jewish tradition maintains that “for the
imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth” (Gen. 8:21); thus, a reasonable
account of evil and violence must acknowledge the reality and prevalence of terror and
violence. There is an antithesis to the concept of the monster and this implies that
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ordinary persons do not perpetrate evil deeds, that is, evil is not an inherent part of us.
In short, one can be kept at bay as a mutation of the human psyche.
•

Many cases of terrorism are justified in the media as being based on noble ideals that
sanction killings of individuals as a preliminary stage for a positive social, economical,
political or religious Moslem revolution. That is, terror is viewed as a legitimate tool for
social, political or religious progress that requires a war of destruction, a merciless war
to the death. It entails an infatuation with destruction expressed in acts of terror. Many
leaders who favor terror as a legitimate tool for achieving religious, political or social
goals seek to illuminate, i.e. broadcast or amplify their problems by creating acts of
terror. They would argue that they have contributed far less to the sum total of human
violence than that generated by state-sponsored violence, mass ideologies of the past
(i.e. fascist, Nazism, Communism, religious wars, etc.), organized crime or poverty or
diseases. “Current national-religious terror,” they argue, “never reached the level of
organization and indiscriminate slaughter generated by wars, nor have they practiced
wholesale genocide as some governments have done.”

•

To a large extent, it was a lament over the death culture expressed by Hassan, the
religious hero of Shiites’ Moslems, that has made deep inroads among Palestinian youth
who, if they are not deflected from this line of thought, will be lost to the mainstream of
the Palestinian national movement and be pulled to the extreme. This phenomenon is
reminiscent of two similar phenomena, the mode of suicide that swept Romantics in
Europe after Goethe published The Sorrows of Young Werther (Goethe, 1989), and the
success of instructors in a fanatic Islamic organization in Algeria in perpetrating terrorist
attacks from which there was no avenue of escape. “What will life be like after death or
after the victory?” the suicide candidates asked (many of them eventually changed their
minds and surrendered to authorities). “Like in telenovellas,” the instructors promised,
“not like in the Koran - like in telenovellas.”

•

Terror as a crucial risk in a post-colonial society denotes rationalization of violence and
terror by arguing that it falls in line with historical parallels or theoretical cases. In other
words, one can pin the country's troubles – namely war and terror, poverty and a
protracted conflict – on the long process of de-colonization and the special conditions of
the State of Israel vis-à-vis the idle east. So it is argued that the breakdown of the peace
process generated and even amplified Muslim radicalism and opposition to Jewish
society while secularists and peace-seekers served as a hotbed for warring political
factions and armed militias. In the ensuing chaos, it is hardly surprising that Islamic
fundamentalism has been perceived as evil and blamed for terror and violence, while
others place the blame on ‘Jewish colonialism’ for creating a constant state of violence
and terror (Aussaresses, 2001; Le Sueur, & Bourdieu, 2000; Stora, 2001).

Acts of terror have reinforced the post-colonial stream in Israeli society and it has
become seen as a challenge to formal Israeli history curriculum, cultural education and
moral education. Post-Zionism, as a post-colonial stream is a cultural, historical, political
and social school, seeks to prove the lack of moral validity of the Zionist dream in
contemporary times. Its major aim is to expose the current situation in Israel as a phase
during which Zionist truths about the moral purpose of Jewish nationalism has almost
completely collapsed. Consequently, the major task of this trend is to give accurate,
reasonable and realistic answers to the circumstances and major reasons of contemporary
culture of violence and terror. However, the major studies of the Post-Zionism are related to
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processes of reflection on the major problems of Israeli society and culture, so that all the
way through these reflections, the major causes for the contemporary state of terror reveal
themselves and are better comprehended.
Post-Zionists claim to be post-modernist, meaning they subscribe to a philosophical
school that views everything as relative and seeks to deconstruct and transcend modern
reality and values. This way of thinking was first introduced into Israeli life through the
work of Israeli academics, particularly historians and sociologists. New Historians and New
Sociologists, as these individuals described themselves, challenged mainstream Zionist
historiography as ideologically biased in employing research to prove the moral validity of
the Zionist claims.
Starting an intuitive journey into the depths of the characteristics of Israeli culture, a
broad-spectrum diagnosis exposes the Israeli addiction to power. Nowadays, it is a general
assumption that Israeli society has adopted, with almost no questions asked, the culture of
power and the belief that the relationship between Israel and its neighbors must be based
almost exclusively on military might. It is further assumed that since the creation of the State
of Israel in 1948, its leadership has generally preferred to use force to solve problems, not all
of which have been life-and-death issues. This means that peace has not always headed
Israel’s list of priorities and war has not always headed the list of priorities of its neighbors.
This is, in fact, a bald denial of the sacrosanct Israeli ethos according to which Israel
has always aspired to peace, a road its neighbors have constantly refused to tread preferring
to travel, instead, the path of the war. Several New Historians identify and analyze this
tendency of the Israeli political and military establishments. Following in their footsteps,
Israeli society as a whole base themselves on this culture of power and on the understanding
that every problem Israel faces can be solved through the use of military power. They
present their thesis to the general public of Israel's consistent choice of the military option
and believe that there are three factors behind this choice:
•

First is the victory of the "offensive ethos" and its transformation into one
of Israel's major policies.

•

Second, the institutionalization of power and its total transfer to the
responsibility of political and military establishments.

•

Third, Israel's military success in the past, i.e. every successful war has
made it that much easier to opt for the use of power in the next war.

•

Fourth, symbols of right and wrong ideology have become lodged in the
Israeli political consciousness and decision-making culture. These
symbols make certain choices automatically less acceptable, and in doing
so they impoverish the process by which policy is made. Israeli society is
biased in favor of opinions that it considers to be the tough ones and
against those that are seem to be tender. Therefore, the value of toughness
is an end in itself.

These reasons provide a basic understanding of the processes that have led to the fact
that Israeli society has learned how to live with the consistent choice of the military
alternative which has turned into the development of a unique culture which could be termed
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a military one. In this culture, military issues receive top priority and invariably take
precedence over all of Israeli society's other spheres of activity.
Israel is still the only country in the Western World where security problems
constitute so central a component in its very essence. This fact is reflected in the degree, to
which national resources are allocated, directly or indirectly to defense, to the extent of the
average Israeli citizen's service and involvement in the army, in the percentage of security
research studies and in similar quantitative terms. Moreover, from the standpoint of the
national psyche and of the government's considerations, defense occupies a central and
prestigious position on the national agenda in a manner that is distinct from the way defense
is viewed in other democratic nations.
The analysis of this particular national psyche and the establishment’s national
considerations leads to one of the central concepts of Israeli military culture, namely that
there is no social-political option on which Israel can base its security. The conclusion is that
Israel has only the military option that is regarded as inevitable. The Israeli national psyche
suffers from profound trauma of continuous war and terror, events that upset its fundamental
ideas about what can and should happen and challenge the authority of its basic values. In
every particular case, political, social, economic, military or religious people look to their
myths for precedents, invoking past experience embodied in their myths as a way of getting
handle on crisis.
Such a Weltanschauung, i.e. that the use of military power is unavoidable, appears on
center stage in terms of both public life and the Israeli psyche, and was the rise of the
concept of power in the Israeli ethos. Frightening the public is an example of how Israel's
political-military leadership uses fear-mongering tactics in security issues. That leadership
generates anxiety in order to mobilize Israeli society and deflect the public's scrutiny of from
domestic problems, such as a deteriorating economic situation, a growing unemployment
rate or a collapsing system of education. The current country's leadership is not interested in
broadcasting calm but instead chooses to make use of these genuine feelings of anxiety in
order to mobilize the Jewish community in Israel, the Jewish people as a whole and the
international community to further the Israeli issue.
The old-new contra-point argument against the previous assumptions of the NewHistorians is that the military option and the use of military might have been forced upon
Israel. Israel has no other choice but to fight wars which have been forced upon it and must
be won in order to prevent its annihilation. Israel's unique situation revealed by officials and
non-official speakers is of a country confronted by the aggression of it’s Arab nations and
which has no real option of turning to the social-political sphere in order to obtain a
compromise that would constitute a genuine breakthrough as no compromise would ever
satisfy the Arab nations. Consequently, the concept by which the only way to deal with the
problems created by Israel's conflict with the Arab states is the use of military power has not
remained solely a theoretical idea but has been translated into actual policies
The Israeli establishment and many historians reject the New Historians arguments
for the simple reason that social-political experience in the history of modern Israel has
demonstrated that even when such political manipulation is carried out, it never leads to
disaster. Furthermore, the leadership in both the political and military spheres is never called
upon to give an accounting of such manipulative actions to the public.
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Another issue that is far from being discussed in Israeli society and its system of
education is the military’s involvement in policy-making processes. It is one thing to draw
up a blueprint for war and implement it. That is the job of an army in a democratic regime. It
is quite another thing, though, to intervene in the political-diplomatic debate, not as an expert
military consultant but rather as someone who has a clearly defined approach and who tries
to induce decision-makers, even through the use of force, to accept it.
This extremely important topic has not been echoed in Israeli history textbooks,
lessons or public debate, although there is no other democracy on earth where the army has
such a major role and exerts such critical influence on policy-making. In addition to the
existence of a “military culture” facilitating such a situation, another central factor to
consider is the total absence of any agencies or mechanisms capable of submitting a policy
proposal to policy-makers that may be considered as an alternative to the policy formulated
by the army.
Another major argument that has been developed by the New Historians in reference
to Israeli military culture, points towards the total denial of any criticism by the defense
establishment in general, and the army in particular because criticism could do serious harm
to their ability to function and thus, in the final analysis, could undermine national security.
Since the army is perceived as the sole instrument capable of saving the country from the
threat of annihilation, any blow dealt to the military is interpreted as a direct blow to national
security. Therefore, the army and the defense establishment are simply not issues for public
debate. In light of this situation, the assignment of a unique status to the subject of defense
has become a sacred cow that must never be harmed and whose functioning of operations
and decisions must never be questioned. As a result, no public debate has ever been held on
issues pertaining to the application of force primarily because the successes in this field have
been perceived as the successes of the political and military establishments.
The social-political consequences of the military culture have preceded a convenient
basis for the development of a taboo on anything that could be construed as criticism
regarding defense issues in general and the use of force in particular. Consequently, the
Israeli defense establishment seeks to prevent any open debate on the history of the use of
force by Israel and on the manner in which force is applied by Israel today. The lack of
public debate has far-reaching implications because making peace with survival based solely
on the application of force blinds us to both external and internal change.
Regarding this blindness, here one could mention the fact that the Israeli public takes
little notice of many peace initiatives. Moreover, the Israeli society is not aware of the farreaching consequences that may arise from the massive use of military force in the occupied
territories that has developed over the past three years. Nor is it aware of the gradual process
in which segments of Israeli society are adopting more and more signs of fascism. The
culture of power has influenced the development of Israeli society's system of norms and
values as well as the human infrastructure that did not try to fight the violent reality into
which they had been born. Instead, they surrendered themselves wholly to that reality.
These perceptions of Israeli society are far more outreaching from Israeli curricula as
well as the implementations of the Palestinian nationalism and usage of power. It is also one
of the arguments of the New Historians that Palestinian nationalism is a response to external
forces more than it is an internal development and the “digestion” of external influences.
Besides, reflecting on the tendency of Israeli historiography to wage wars, the organizing
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principle of the history of Zionism and the State of Israel could lead to the conclusion that
wars are not necessarily the high point of the story. The noise of battle often conceals the
fact that war is just an ending, or an introduction to new chapters of immigration and
population movement, generational change and changes in social values alongside economic
and social changes.
Relating both to Israel and to the Palestinians, positive manifestations are to be
anticipated, namely the transition from a position of denying the other as a condition for the
formulation of an independent identity to a position of coexistence with the other, as well as
a commitment to resolve the conflict through dialogue and not through violence. From the
other point of view, the negative manifestations have been the emergence of an
asymmetrical agreement favoring the stronger side, Israel, without mechanisms that will
decrease the gap. The Palestinian side relinquished a priori, i.e. its main card recognition of
Israel, but received very little authority and territory and a great many vague promises that it
stood to lose as well because of Israel's Jewish settlement activities in the territories. Israel
had very few incentives to concede in a situation in which the power relations were in its
favor and a Palestinian impetus emerged to use violence in order to narrow the gap; no
mechanisms were introduced that would prevent extremists from blowing up the process by
means of terror and succeeding in imposing a veto on the process.
On both sides, there were unstable political configurations. The leaderships engaged
in attempts to conciliate their coalition partners and sent out contradictory messages, focused
on short-term goals and erred in underestimating the public support that was needed to
achieve real progress in the process. The peace process does not include a mechanism for
mediation and compromise for reciprocal accusations of breaking the agreement. The
advantage of direct bilateral contacts, which created certain agreements without
intermediaries, became disadvantages.
As a result, the far-reaching New-Historians theories deserve an in-depth study by
researchers, students and the general public for all intents and purposes during an era when
the Weltanschauung of the country's policy-makers almost totally reject any possibility of
self-restraint or compromise. Israeli decision makers as well as general public opinion need a
better understanding in order to form a consensus with which they must learn to live. The
consensus regards national security and Israel’s very existence as topics that can never be
separated. Consequently, in line with this approach, security considerations must take
precedence over every other consideration, including democratic principles.
The challenge each and every educator faces is to move beyond tendencies to treat
terrorism as stable, rational and comprehensible phenomena. Ethics curriculums, civic
education and democratic studies aspire to nurture a humanistic tradition and promote moral
education activities across the board among the vast majority of Israeli and Arabs. The
reality of terror and violence experienced by members of Israeli and Palestinian societies
could act as a touchstone for testing the impact of various civic and moral programs exposing far more about the subjects’ inner world and moral attitudes than any other moral,
religious, political, social or ideological concept and terror (Aussaresses, 2001; Le Sueur, &
Bourdieu, 2000; Stora, 2001).

The publics’ attitude towards the problems and explanations of terror and violence are
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of vital importance for Israeli society as well for many other societies these days. As far as it
can be ascertained through the observations in this study, the general publics’ attitude could
be defined as a mildly moral realistic one: people think that terror, evil and violence have
objective foundations but certainly embody some subjective human conventions and beliefs.
Terror and violence should not be defined according to abstract conceptions of morality, but
comprehended in conjunction with actual behavior and deed. In spite of the fact that moral
values and definitions of violence and terror vary depending on the cultural background of
the respondents, every illuminated and civilized human being need to condemn such deeds
universally and in one clear voice.
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